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21st Century Political Warfare

Victory without Casualties:
Russia’s Information Operations
T. S. Allen and A. J. Moore
ABSTRACT: This article argues Russian information operations are
a decisive tool of state power rather than a supporting element.
Uniquely, Russian leaders are significantly more likely to employ
diplomatic, military, and economic tools in pursuit of informational
objectives than other states’ leaders.

R

ussia is a resurgent geopolitical actor that the United States
identified as a major competitor in the 2017 National Security
Strategy.1 Russia has maintained its position as a great power,
despite its relative material weakness, through its superior use of
information as a tool of asymmetric statecraft. Russian leaders consider
information operations (IO) a decisive tool of state power and engage
in continuous international competition in the information domain
executed by both state and nonstate actors. These coordinated efforts
to project influence using information and disinformation make Russian
foreign policy unique. The logic of information operations often guides
Russia’s coordinated military, diplomatic, and economic efforts. Whereas
other states’ information operations are generally guided by facts, Russia’s
foreign policymakers create “facts” to be broadcast to targeted audiences
in order to achieve strategic objectives.
Although Russia has long employed information as a tool of state
power, since 2013 its military thinkers have increasingly adopted a
novel approach to information that places such considerations at the
forefront of their strategy. Scholars and policymakers have used many
phrases—including new generation warfare, new-type warfare, hybrid
warfare, and nonlinear warfare—to describe this contemporary military
doctrine.2 But these phrases often obscure Russian thinking. Just as
previous Soviet leaders did, today’s Russian military leaders attempt to
obfuscate their intentions and to malign their competitors by accusing
their opponents of employing Russia’s desired military capabilities.3
In a widely quoted article on modern warfare, Russian Armed Forces
Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov noted the effectiveness with
which Western powers were using information to subvert states. Some
commentators, including many in Russia, exaggerated the importance of
Gerasimov’s article, claiming it was the foundation of a new doctrine.
Russian-controlled propaganda outlets used a prominent repudiation of
these reports as evidence that Russia had a fundamentally benign foreign

1      Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017).
2      Timothy L. Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” Military Review 97, no.
4 (July/ August 2017).
3      Timothy L. Thomas, Thinking Like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the
Nature of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), 5.
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policy, was not subverting its neighbors, and was under attack by enemy
propagandists.4 Moreover, the Kremlin asserted the Color revolutions in
Georgia (2012), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005); the Arab Spring
in the Middle East and North Africa (2010–11), and even the Moscow
protests (2011–12) were the result of planned Western interventions
using hybrid warfare.5 Russia claims only foreign states conduct hybrid
warfare (Гибридная война). But Russia clearly does as well. As Dmitri
Peskov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, said in 2017,
“If you call what’s going on now a hybrid war, let it be hybrid war. It
doesn’t matter: It’s war.” 6
Information operations, a key component of Russia’s contemporary
way of war, encompasses all the uses of information and disinformation,
by states or nonstate actors, as a tool of state power and includes military
information support operations, cyberspace operations, electronic
warfare, military deception, psychological operations, public affairs,
and strategic communications. In 2011, the Russian Ministry of
Defense concept for future information operations defined information
warfare (информационная война) “as the ability to . . . undermine
political, economic, and social systems; carry out mass psychological
campaigns against the population of a state in order to destabilize
society and the government; and force a state to make decisions in the
interest of their opponents.” 7 Russian military doctrine also describes
a broader concept of information confrontation (информационное
противоборство) that incorporates military/technical battlefield
effects and informational/psychosocial effects “designed to shape
perceptions and manipulate the behavior of target audiences.” 8 The
distinction between information war and information confrontation is
the “subject of detailed debate in official Russian sources” but is “of little
practical impact for assessing Russian approaches.” 9 Thus, this article
expands on Russian definitions to encompass all aspects of Russian
information operations as it is executed.
Many people outside Russia recognize Russian information
operations and statecraft are unique, a “sharp power” influence that is
“not principally about attraction or even persuasion; instead, it centers on
distraction and manipulation.” 10 Some Western military thinkers have
also echoed Russia’s emphasis on informational/psychosocial effects.
According to the US Department of Defense, information operations
“ultimately register an impact in the human cognitive dimension,”
4      Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’,” Foreign Policy, March 5,
2018; and “ ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ Finally Put To Rest? Russia ‘Expert’ Apologizes for Coining
Snappy Term,” RT, March 6, 2018.
5      Nicolas Bouchet, “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Revolutions,” CSS Policy Perspectives 4,
no. 2 (January 2016).
6      Dmitri Peskov, quoted in Jim Rutenberg, “RT, Sputnik and Russia’s New Theory of War,” New
York Times Magazine, September 13, 2017.
7      Conceptual Views regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information
Space (Moscow: Russian Ministry of Defense, 2011) quoted in Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s 21st
Century Information War: Working To Undermine and Destabilize Populations,” Defence Strategic
Communications 1, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 12.
8      Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great
Power Aspirations (Arlington, VA: DIA, 2017), 38.
9      Kier Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, fellowship monograph 9 (Rome: NATO
Defense College, 2016), 6.
10      Christopher Walter and Jessica Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian
States Project Influence,” Snapshot (blog), Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2017.
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which is “composed of the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of those
who transmit, receive, respond to, or act upon information.” 11 Some
strategists suggest military organizations conduct cognitive maneuver to
affect the cognitive domain, in a manner similar to the Russia concept
of information confrontation.12 But unlike the Western understandings,
Russians perceive information operations to be a decisive tool, rather
than a supporting element, of state power.

Origins

Modern Russian information operations are shaped by many
traditions. Russian leaders have long placed exceptional value on using
information to manipulate their enemies. Russian scholars developed
an elaborate theory of information operations called reflexive control
(Рефлексивное управление) that “occurs when the controlling organ
conveys (to the objective system) motives and reasons that cause it to
reach the desired decision, the nature of which is maintained in strict
secrecy.” 13 This theory uses all means available to shape the information
environment and manipulate what an opponent thinks to force him to
make a desirable decision.14
At the tactical level, czarist and Soviet forces were masters of
tactical military deception (маскировка). At the strategic level, Soviet
intelligence and security services were primarily focused on subversion,
known as active measures (активные мероприятия). Since forming the
first Foreign Bureau of the czarist secret police, Okhrana, in 1883, Russia
has pursued its foreign policy objectives through subversion. During
the Cold War, the intelligence services were the Soviet Union’s main
tool for shaping the international environment.15 These agencies used
active measures and reflexive control to undermine Russia’s enemies
and were also paranoid regarding adversarial countermeasures. The
Soviet Union’s active measures during the Cold War sought to divide
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, subvert
governments not aligned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), and shape the class consciousness of targeted societies to make
them more amenable to the Communist agenda.16 The United States
and its allies countered these efforts using both defensive means and
countermeasures such as Voice of America and BBC broadcasts of proWestern information into the Eastern Bloc. By the 1970s, about half of
the Soviet population routinely listened to Western radio broadcasts.17
11      US Department of Defense (DoD), Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment
(Washington, DC: DoD, 2016).
12      Allison Astorino-Courtois, ed., “A Cognitive Capabilities Agenda: A Multi-Step Approach
for Closing DoD’s Cognitive Capability Gap” (white paper, Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment
Office, October 2017).
13      Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies 7 (2004): 241.
14      Can Kasapoglu, “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive
Control,” research paper 121 (Rome: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Defense
College, 2015).
15      Ben B. Fischer, “Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police,” Central
Intelligence Agency, July 7, 2008.
16      Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive
and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 9–17.
17      Gregory Mitrovich, “Cold War Broadcasting Impact” (report, Hoover Institution and Cold
War International History Project conference, Stanford University, October 13–16, 2004), 19.
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Although Soviet active measures efforts were more extensive,
aggressive, and better coordinated than similar Western efforts, they
were not ultimately successful.18 The transatlantic Alliance survived,
while Western information exposed Soviet hypocrisy and contributed
to the political collapse of the Soviet Union. Retrospectively, some
Russian scholars claimed the United States employed reflexive control
to undermine the Soviet Union by provoking it into a costly arms race
it could not win in the 1980s.19 As early as 1990, the KGB also began
publicizing conspiracy theories about vast American efforts to subvert
the USSR. 20 Other Russians blamed the destabilizing myth of capitalist
plenty and the American Dream for causing mass discontent.21 In sum,
many Russians believe Western efforts to subvert the Soviet Union with
information were far more extensive—and successful—than they in
fact were, which helps explain their confidence in the effectiveness of
information operations. Russians also believe the United States continues
to wage a massive information campaign against Russia. Putin has even
claimed the internet is a “CIA project” intended to undermine Russia.22
Today, Russia invests in information operations capabilities
due to their cost effectiveness and strategic impact. Despite recent
modernization, Russia is unlikely to defeat the United States or NATO
in a conventional military conflict. But the Kremlin wishes to reassert
its historic control over former Soviet states, including some NATO
members, and to increase its influence in the Middle East relative to that
exerted by the United States. To solidify control without provoking a war
it cannot win, Russia competes with the West by using a key nonmilitary
means, information operations, in the gray zone short of declared war.23

Decisiveness

Russian leaders think they can win wars with information operations
partially due to their belief that America prevailed in the Cold War
with Western reflexive control initiatives, intelligence-led subversion
campaigns, and the promise of capitalism. Every senior Russian leader
today “went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones” when
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.24 As Russia recovered from this
catastrophe, intelligence and military officers faced near-state collapse
and rampant cronyism, and in many cases, became enmeshed in
organized crime.25 Russian leaders also set out to rethink and to retool
the art of subversion. In the 1998 book If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict, Russian General Makhmut Akhmetovich
18      Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and the Shield, xxx.
19      Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control,” 239.
20      Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and the Shield, 479.
21      Svetlana Aleksievich, Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets, trans. Bela Shayevich (New York:
Random House, 2016), 166.
22      Ewen MacAskill, “Putin Calls Internet a ‘CIA Project’ Renewing Fears of Web Breakup,”
Guardian, April 24, 2014. Some early Internet users also thought the internet could undermine Soviet
information control. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Kremlin’s Wars on the
Internet (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 1–63.
23      Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February
5, 2016.
24      Putin repeated this phrase when he described the collapse of the Soviet Union during his
2014 speech on the annexation of Crimea. “Address by President of the Russian Federation,”
Kremlin, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
25      Edward Lucas, Deception: Spies, Lies and How Russian Dupes the West (London: Bloomsbury,
2012), 316.
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Gareev argued information operations would be the decisive element
in future wars.
The systematic broadcasting of psychologically- and ideologically-biased
materials of a provocative nature, mixing partially truthful and false items
of information . . . can all result in a mass psychosis, despair and feelings
of doom and undermine trust in the government and armed forces; and, in
general, lead to the destabilization of the situation in those countries, which
become objects of information warfare, creating a fruitful soil for actions
of the enemy. 26

As early as 2004, Russian military academic Vladimir Slipchenko
stated, “Information has become a destructive weapon just like a bayonet,
bullet or projectile.” 27 More recent Russian military statements also
suggest the decisive nature of information operations. In 2013, Gerasimov
argued, “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political goals has
grown and, in many cases, they have succeeded the power of force of
weapons in their effectiveness.” He claimed contemporary states can
be rapidly overpowered by “means of a concealed character, including
carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special
operations forces.” 28 Likewise, an article in the Russian journal Military
Thought argued “information superiority and anticipatory operations will
be the main ingredients of success in new-generation wars.” 29
After invading Georgia in 2008, Russia redoubled its efforts to
improve its IO capabilities.30 When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, it
employed these new capabilities in the culmination of a long-standing
Russian IO campaign to influence the Russian diaspora in Crimea and
convince the world that Ukraine, which was previously part of the
Soviet Union, is not a state and has no independent culture. In 2014,
about 27 percent of Ukrainians watched Russian television, which is
Russia’s main propaganda tool and the primary source of information
in most post-Soviet states.31 Russia also has employed extensive online
propaganda against Ukraine since the early 2000s. 32 Additionally, since
Russia resumed control of the Black Sea Fleet’s leased port at Sevastopol,
Crimea, in 1997, it established an air of Russian superiority over Ukrainian
armed forces personnel stationed on adjacent bases, which undermined
the morale of the Ukrainian forces there.33
26      Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict,
ed. Jacob W. Kipp (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 51–52.
27      Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko, Future War (Fort Leavenworth:
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2007), 33.
28      Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Military-Industrial Kurier,
February 27, 2013, translated in Robert Coalson, “Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s Plan for
Ukraine,” The Blog, Huffington Post, September 2, 2014.
29      Sergei G. Chekinov and Sergei A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation
War,” Military Thought 4 (2013), 23.
30      Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August
2008,” in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, ed. Stephen J.
Blank and Richard Weitz (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).
31      Kateryna Kruk, Analyzing the Ground Zero: What Western Countries Can Learn from Ukrainian
Experience of Combating Russian Disinformation, Kremlin Watch Report 11.12.2017 (Prague: European
Values, 2017), 13.
32      Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive
Summary, working paper 2017.11 (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2017), 4.
33      Ilan Berman, “How Russian Rule Has Changed Crimea,” Snapshot (blog), Foreign Affairs, July
13, 2017.
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The Russian invasion of Crimea, the culmination of Russia’s
decades-long cognitive attack on Ukraine, altered the identity of
Crimeans and solidified their nascent Russian identity. Instead of waking
up in a different country, Crimeans woke up in a country they had been
conditioned to believe was theirs all along. Before the invasion began,
cells of Russian agents travelled to Crimea to coordinate unrest. Then,
in February 2014, Russian soldiers wearing no identifiable insignia
invaded Crimea.34 The Ukrainian security services were isolated by an
“electronic knockdown.” The massive cyberattack by Russia’s state and
nonstate actors amplified the effects of tactical electronic warfare and
the coordinated seizure of key pieces of physical information technology
by armed forces.35 The Ukrainians were also uncertain of their legal
chain of command due to the ongoing political upheaval in Ukraine.
Military members were uncertain if their officers had been coopted and
uncertain of the enemy’s identity. The majority of the Ukraine’s armed
forces withdrew from Crimea without fighting.
The logic of information operations drove Russian tactical actions
in Crimea. Russian forces rapidly seized physical control of key media
infrastructure in the region.36 At key military installations, Russia
paralyzed Ukrainian forces by surrounding them with concentric
cordons of military personnel, Cossacks, and pro-Russian pensioners.
The inner cordon of Russian military personnel was thus concealed,
while the outer cordon presented a sympathetic popular face that
Ukrainian relief forces could not fight though. This formation posed an
impossible tactical/informational dilemma to Ukrainian forces. Russian
forces ensured there were television cameras ready to film powerful
propaganda if the Ukrainian forces attacked the elderly “protestors” and
effectively deterred a Ukrainian defense.37
By leading with information operations, Russia conquered Crimea
without physically fighting for it. Only one soldier, a Ukrainian, was
killed during the annexation, a figure which stands in stark contrast
to the 90,000 Russians and Germans who died fighting over the same
territory during World War II. Russia had effectively used information
as a substitute for blood and treasure, and had achieved what some
Ukrainians refer to as “victory without casualties.” Putin later admitted
that Russian soldiers had seized Crimea, although during the invasion,
the Russian government claimed no Russian troops were involved.38
The denials were part of an extensive global disinformation campaign
incorporating several narratives tailored to convince international
policymakers and populations that Russia was not attacking Ukraine,
which disrupted any potential international response.39
34      Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Little Green Men:” A Primer on Modern
Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine, 2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations
Command, 2015).
35      András Rácz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist, report 13
(Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [FIIA], 2015), 39.
36      Johns Hopkins, “Little Green Men,” 47.
37     Interviews with Ukrainian witnesses to the 2014 Russian military intervention in Crimea, 2015.
38      “Putin Admits Russian Forces Were Deployed to Crimea,” Reuters, April 17, 2014; and
“Little Green Men: The Annexation of Crimea as an Emblem of pro-Kremlin Disinformation,”
EU vs Disinfo, March 16, 2018.
39      Katri Pynnöniemi and András Rácz, eds., Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the
Conflict in Ukraine, report 45 (Helsinki: FIIA, 2016).
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Russian IO efforts have been most extensive and successful at home:
“Russia is actively fortifying the mentality of its citizenry for war.” 40 The
majority of the Russian people support Russian foreign policy, especially
towards the United States and NATO.41 Even the Russian opposition’s
resistance to Russia’s blatantly illegal intervention in Ukraine remains
muted.42 Russia achieved this apparent national unity by inundating its
population with pro-Kremlin propaganda at an accelerated pace since
2013.43 No Russian IO efforts abroad have been comparably extensive
or successful.
Efforts in Russian-speaking Ukraine extend from this internal
effort. Soviet propaganda once portrayed Donbas as a cornerstone of
the Soviet industrial base. Joseph Stalin named Sevastopol and Kerch
Hero Cities for withstanding Nazi sieges during the Second World
War. And Russia weaponizes this heritage with constant references to
the Great Patriotic War and use of the St. George ribbon and Soviet
iconography, which promulgate identity-based narratives that mobilize
Pan-Slavic and Russian nationalism.44 Similarly, messages of post-Soviet
identity delivered on Russian television, from digital sources, and in print
publications in Ukraine provide purpose and motivation to separatists
and Russian proxy forces.45

Characteristics

Russia’s information operations maintain continuous activity as the
nation is always in a declared or undeclared war.46 A hybrid force of
state and coerced or co-opted nonstate actors execute information
confrontation. This force promotes the state’s carefully crafted emotional
appeals to manipulate a variety of audiences.47 As a post-truth society,
Russia promotes a subverted reality by inviting relativism through
messages such as RT’s motto: “Question more.” 48 Through such
actions as expelling foreign media and nongovernmental organizations,
and maintaining state ownership of media platforms outside of Russia,
Russia maintains platform control, which gives it the capability to reach key
domestic and foreign audiences.49 No less important than the previous
characteristics is the manipulation of the Russian diaspora—individuals with
actual or latent Russian identities—that Russia pursues to garner the
40      Lukas Milevski, “Prospective Strategy for Baltic Defense: The Russian Public and War
Termination in the Baltic States,” Military Review 98, no. 1 (January/February 2018): 68.
41      Margaret Vice, Russians Remain Confident in Putin’s Global Leadership (Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center Report, 2017).
42      Robert Mackey, “Navalny’s Comments on Crimea Ignite Russian Twittersphere,” New York
Times, October 16, 2014.
43      Soldatov and Borogan, Red Web, 149–73.
44      Masha Gessen, The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia (New York: Riverhead
Books, 2017), 435; and Sergei Kurginyan, “ ‘Essence of Time’ Manifesto,” Europe Essense of Time,
August 14, 2011, http://eot.su/sites/default/files/manifest_eot.pdf.
45      Kruk, “Analyzing the Ground Zero,” 13.
46      Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, 16–32; and John Chambers, Countering GrayZone Hybrid Threats: An Analysis of Russia’s ‘New Generation Warfare’ and Implications for the US Army
(West Point, NY: Modern War Institute, 2016), 26.
47      Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Before the Senate
Intelligence Committee 115th Cong. (March 30, 2017) (testimony, Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow,
Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Senior Fellow, Center for Cyber and Homeland Security,
George Washington University).
48      Gessen, Future is History, 22.
49      “Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups,” Human Rights Watch, March 6, 2018.
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support of those most likely to accept the Kremlin’s scripted narratives
as fundamentally correct.50

Hybrid Force

Hybrid actors receive instructions from the presidential
administration and the Russian intelligence and security services. In
some cases, such as Ukraine in 2014, the entities coordinate operations
very effectively. But much of the time, they appear less well coordinated.
The key to effective coordination is probably direct involvement and
clear guidance from Putin, who is capable of taking total control of
special operations when he considers it necessary despite his struggle to
exercise command and control of the Russian government.51 Since 2008,
the Russian armed forces have also formed information operations
troops and enhanced information capabilities.52 Nongovernment
entities such as the Internet Research Agency, an infamous troll
farm that produces manipulative social media content, and groups of
supportive or coerced hackers also conduct information operations in
coordination with the Russian government.53 The involvement of such
nonstate actors has increased the flexibility and deniability of Russian
information operations.

Emotional Appeal

Russian leadership develops narratives with an emotional appeal
that can be transmitted through traditional media and online social
networks. They rely on individuals they do not command to spread their
narrative. Although Russian actors employ fake social media profiles
to plant stories and about 45 percent of Twitter activity within Russia
originates with bots, these profiles have limited direct reach outside
Russia.54 To reach the international audience, Russia manipulates
individuals into propagating the state’s narrative using novel, emotionally
appealing stories, which are often completely false.
Russia does not lead with a fact-based narrative because novel
stories spread more rapidly than more mundane stories on social media.
When artfully written, Russia’s stories easily make the jump from the
bubble of trolls and bots to mainstream audiences around the world.
“Lies,” as one analysis of computational propaganda puts it, “spread
faster than the truth.” 55 In one remarkable example of disinformation
in 2014, Russian media claimed Ukrainian soldiers had crucified a child
whose family supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The false story
rapidly went viral and spread across social media in Russia, Ukraine,
and the West.56 Conversely, the more believable and truthful stories
promulgated by Western information operations spread less rapidly and
50      Rhonda S. Zaharna, “Reassessing ‘Whose Story Wins’: The Trajectory of Identity Resilience
in Narrative Contests,” International Journal of Communication 10 (2016): 4407–38.
51      Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russia Politics under Putin: The System Will Outlast the Master,” Foreign
Affairs 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016).
52      DIA, Russian Military Power, 32.
53      DIA, Russian Military Power, 40.
54      Woolley and Howard, Computational Propaganda, 4.
55      Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,”
Science 359, no. 6380 (March 2018): 1146–51, doi:10.1126/science.aap9559.
56      Anna Nemtsova, “There’s No Evidence the Ukrainian Army Crucified a Child in Slovyansk,”
Daily Beast, July 15, 2014.
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are at a significant disadvantage in the competition to be novel, trending,
and viral. 57

Subverted Reality

Beyond spreading flagrant lies, Russian information operations seek
to enhance relativism and subvert the very idea of an objective, impartial,
or nonpartisan truth, which leads audiences to approach every truthclaim with the fundamental belief that nothing is certain. Relativism
maximizes Russian influence because relativistic populations are more
vulnerable to emotional manipulation and reflexive control. Relativism
also undermines the credibility of Western institutions and leaders.
Moreover, these disruptions to basic political and media functions delay
international responses to the Kremlin’s deniable gray-zone activity by
drawing out the time it takes for other states to recognize and to develop
political consensus about Russian actions.
Another strategy for subverting reality, disseminating multiple
contradictory narratives, creates information fatigue in which populations are overwhelmed with information and unable to determine what
information is accurate—or more dangerously, no longer care.58

Platform Control

The Russian government has the ability to influence or control many
mass-media platforms. Within Russia, leaders have sought to eliminate
sources of information that deviate from the official line. Russian officials
suspect foreign entities because Russia’s own media and many Russian
nongovernmental organizations are tools of the state. Even in the West,
many popular television channels and radio stations, such as Sputnik, RT,
and Anna News, are agents of Russian influence. Numerous US media
outlets, especially online, cite or copy Russian-generated stories. Online,
platform control is less important, as social media can be influenced by
bots and reflexive control of mainstream users.
Russia has recognized the emerging threat since at least 2000
when the Russian national security concept claimed “a serious danger
arises from the desire of a number of countries to dominate the global
information domain space.” 59 In 2014 Russian law mandated all digital
data on Russian citizens be stored inside its borders.60 More recently, an
advisor to Putin said Russia is prepared to be isolated from the global
internet.61 Russia has also banned most use of personal social media
accounts by its military personnel.62

57      Mervyn Frost and Nicholas Michelsen, “Strategic Communications in International Relations:
Practical Traps and Ethical Puzzles,” Defence Strategic Communications 2 (2017): 9–34.
58      Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes
Information, Culture and Money (New York: Institute of Modern Russia, 2014); and Christopher Paul
and Miriam Matthews, Russia’s “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options
to Counter It (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
59      “Russia’s National Security Concept,” Arms Control Association, January 1, 2000.
60      Sergei Blagov, “Russia Clarifies Looming Data Localization Law,” Bloomberg Law, August
10, 2015.
61      “Putin Adviser Says Russia Ready To Deal With Internet Cutoff,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, March 6, 2018.
62      “Russian Soldiers To Lose Smartphone Privileges over Leaks,” Moscow Times, February
16, 2018.
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In addition to controlling domestic access to information, Russia
also seeks to isolate other states’ populations from electronic information
for limited periods of time similar to the Ukrainians’ experience in 2014.
Future electronic knockdowns may include physical attacks against
information technology infrastructure that could create an immense
shock in modern, information-centric societies.

Manipulation of the Russian Diaspora

The most successful Russian information operations outside of
Russia target Russian speakers in former Soviet countries where their
narratives resonate. Narrative battles are inherently identity battles.63
Russian diaspora populations exist throughout Russia’s near abroad as
well as the United States and Western Europe. In 1992, President Boris
Yeltsin established Russia’s right to intervene in neighboring states to
protect Russian people. Under Putin, in both Ukraine and Georgia,
Russia has portrayed itself as protecting ethnically Russian separatists
from non-Russophone governments to justify military intervention.
Moreover, Russia’s foreign policy seeks to influence all Russian compatriots,
which include “Russian Federation citizens living abroad, former
citizens of the USSR, Russian immigrants from the Soviet Union or the
Russian Federation, descendants of compatriots, and foreign citizens
who admire Russian culture and language.” 64
Although Russia crafts emotionally appealing nationalist narratives
in which it is the protector of disaffected Russian compatriots abroad, it
would be a mistake to assume that Russian information operations will
only target, or even primarily target, the Russian diaspora. Russia fights
on all narrative fronts and prioritizes to achieve the greatest gains. In the
current conflict in Ukraine, for example, Russia crafts messages to several
different layers of identity-defined audiences. Within Russia, it messages
Russian citizens to ensure their support for the regime, primarily on
television.65 Near Russia, it messages would-be Russian citizens who
are fighting to secede from Ukraine, on television, in print media,
and through directed word-of-mouth.66 Further abroad, it messages
the Russian diaspora population in the West, in Russian on television
and on social media; this population simultaneously receives messages
targeted at the populations of their countries of residence, primarily
on social media. Since these narratives have no guiding logic of facts,
audiences often receive contradictory information. This conflict would
undermine fact-based information but it advances Russia’s objective to
increase relativism.67 Russia is not concerned about its own credibility
because its core identity-defined audience will likely continue to believe
its messaging.

63      Zaharna, “Reassessing ‘Whose Story Wins.’ ”
64      Heather A. Conley et al., Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An Examination of Russian
Compatriot Policy in Estonia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 12.
65      Vera Zakem et al., Mapping Russian Media Network: Media’s Role in Russian Foreign Policy and
Decision-Making (Arlington: CNA, 2018).
66      Kruk, “Analyzing the Ground Zero.”
67      Alexey Kovalev, “Life after Facts: How Russian State Media Defines Itself through
Negation,” openDemocracy, June 13, 2016; and Paul and Matthews, Russia’s “Firehose of Falsehood.”
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While we have been able to observe several major Russian IO
campaigns, there are still many outstanding questions about them. Most
importantly, the West is uncertain if Russian information operations
truly are decisive. The fact that Russia conducts information operations
does not automatically mean it is successfully achieving its objectives
with information operations.
As the West seeks to avert military conflict with Russia,
understanding the conditions under which Russia will escalate from
information operations to armed force is essential—but uncertain.
Distinguishing the opening period of a hybrid campaign from routine
Russian activity is challenging because “the preparatory phase of hybrid
warfare does not differ that much from the conventional tools of Russian
diplomacy.” 68 Russia’s decision to employ military forces is opportunistic
and will likely be made only on the verge of actual operations, as it was
in Crimea.69
Future Russian information operations will not inexorably escalate
to kinetic action. Instead, Russia will consistently use information
operations as an independent, decisive tool of statecraft. Russia launched
an extensive cyberattack against Estonia in 2007 that was broadly
comparable to its electronic knockdown of Georgia in 2008; but it did not
attack Estonia.70 In Estonia and Georgia, similar IO action in different
geopolitical contexts, indicated disparate strategic intent. Given Russia’s
emphasis on the ability of information operations to paralyze military
organizations and whole societies, the Kremlin may attempt to use the
tool to prevent enemy military action as a nonkinetic preemptive or
preventative option.
We must determine how Russia will use information as a future
escalatory or de-escalatory action. We must also determine how Russia
integrates information operations across other domains, which is of
particular interest to the US Army as it develops multidomain battle
doctrine. Russian maneuver in the physical domains of land, sea, air,
and space may be intended to cause effects or to create advantages in the
information domain. It is clear that the Russian armed forces are willing
to use kinetic operations to seize control of key information technology.
The more interesting question is the extent to which they are willing to
use kinetic operations to align ground truth with propaganda themes or
create new propaganda opportunities.

Conclusion

Russia, which claims the internet is a foreign plot, has mastered the
use of the global network as a force-projection platform and a space
for cognitive maneuver. By weaponizing information and employing
information operations as a decisive tool of state power, Russia is now
pressing its offensive advantages in the information domain to nullify its
relative weaknesses in other domains. If Russia can divide any potential
68      Rácz, “Russia’s Hybrid War,” 73.
69      Daniel Triesman, “Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin,” Foreign Affairs
95, no. 3 (May/June 2016).
70      Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” Wired, August
21, 2007.
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political base of support for military operations against it, its military
limitations become irrelevant.
Paradoxically, Russia also is vulnerable in the information domain.
Thus, Russian leaders are working to isolate Russian societies from
supposed Western influence while expanding their own influence abroad.
The Kremlin may be more susceptible to internal pressure than many
have realized, which underscores its weakness. Putin’s aggressive efforts
to control the information domain are driven in part by an awareness
that his aggressive foreign policy carries domestic political risks.
Russia has made a concerted effort to use their most advanced
information capabilities against larger populations to alter recent
elections in several Western countries. Whether this effort had an
impact, however, is a matter of intense debate. 71 If it did not, the
simplest explanation is that Russian operations were always intended for
use in Russia’s near abroad rather than distant states. Subversion, as a
general rule, cannot create political divisions but merely exploit existing
divisions within a population. Russia is intimately aware of—and often
responsible for—the divisions in its near abroad but has a harder time
understanding and manipulating them further afield. Some divisions,
however, are obvious. The most dangerous for the United States is the
inherent division between America and its allies since they are America’s
strategic center of gravity. 72
In a society which values freedom of speech and, arguably, freedom
of information, the United States cannot counter Russian information
operations by imitation. Even at the height of the Cold War, the
United States was never willing to engage in the sort of subversive
influence operations employed by the Soviet Union. The United
States, a democratic country with a strong rule of law, will always be
at a disadvantage in playing a disinformation game. By leveraging its
dominance in the information domain, fortifying itself and its allies
against disinformation, and engaging in a whole-of-society approach to
countering Russian information operations, however, America and its
allies can defeat the Russian threat. Ukraine, which has significantly
inhibited the impact of Russian information operations with private
and public partnerships, is one model to consider. The challenge is to
counter Russian disinformation without undermining Western values
and subverting ourselves.

71      Robert M. Faris et al., Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election, version 1.3 (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, 2017).
72      General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity,”
Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017).
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